

(i) Line item number, in the case of applicable procurement accounts.

(ii) Program element number, in the case of applicable research, development, test, and evaluation accounts.

(iii) Sub-activity group, in the case of applicable operation and maintenance accounts.

(2) **PRIORITY ORDER.**—Each Secretary shall ensure that the unfunded priorities covered by a report under subsection (a) are listed in the order of urgency of priority, as determined by the Under Secretary.

(c) **UNFUNDED PRIORITY DEFINED.**—In this section, the term “unfunded priority”, with respect to a fiscal year, means a project related to a successful project funded under Phase Two of the Small Business Innovation Research or Small Business Technology Transfer program that—

(1) is not funded in the budget of the President for that fiscal year, as submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1105 of title 31, United States Code;

(2) has the potential to—

(A) advance the national security capabilities of the United States;

(B) provide new technologies or processes, or new applications of existing technologies, that will enable new alternatives to existing programs; and

(C) provide future cost savings; and

(3) would have been recommended for funding through the budget referred to in paragraph (1) if—

(A) additional resources had been available for the budget to fund the program, activity, or mission requirement; or

(B) the program, activity, or mission requirement had emerged before the budget was formulated.

**SA 4665.** Ms. MURKOWSKI submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title VIII, add the following:

**SEC. 857. AIR FORCE STRATEGY FOR ACQUISITION OF COMBAT RESCUE AIRCRAFT AND EQUIPMENT.**

The Secretary of the Air Force shall submit to the congressional defense committees a strategy for the Department of the Air Force for the acquisition of combat rescue aircraft and equipment that aligns with the stated capability and capacity requirements of the Air Force to meet the national defense strategy (required under section 113(g) of title 10, United States Code), taking into account regional strategies such as those relating to the Indo-Pacific and Arctic regions.

**SA 4666.** Mr. SULLIVAN (for himself, Mr. KING, and Ms. HIRONO) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title XII, add the following:

**SEC. 1253. BRIEFING ON PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING FOR THE PACIFIC DETERRENCE INITIATIVE.**

(a) **BRIEFING.**—Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall provide to the congressional defense committees a briefing on the processes and guidance used to program and budget for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, including—

(1) the allocation of fiscal topline in the program objective memorandum process to support the Pacific Deterrence Initiative at the outset of the process;

(2) the role of the combatant commanders in setting requirements for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative;

(3) the role of the military departments and other components of the Armed Forces in proposing programmatic options to meet such requirements; and

(4) the role of the combatant commanders, the military departments and other components of the Armed Forces, the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense in adjudicating requirements and programmatic options—

(A) before the submission of the program objective memorandum for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative; and

(B) during program review.

(b) **GUIDANCE.**—In establishing program objective memorandum guidance for fiscal year 2024, the Deputy Secretary of Defense shall ensure that the processes and guidance used to program and budget the Pacific Deterrence Initiative align, as appropriate, with the processes and guidance used to program and budget for the European Deterrence Initiative, including through the allocation of fiscal topline for each such initiative in the fiscal year 2024 process.

**SA 4667.** Mr. SULLIVAN (for himself and Mr. WHITEHOUSE) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle F of title X, add the following:

**SEC. 1054. REPORT ON EFFORTS OF COMBATANT COMMANDS TO COMBAT THREATS POSED BY ILLEGAL, UNREPORTED, AND UNREGULATED FISHING.**

(a) **IN GENERAL.**—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of the Navy, in consultation with the Chief of Naval Research, the chair and deputy chairs of the Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing, and the heads of other relevant agencies, as determined by the Secretary, shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report on the maritime domain awareness efforts of the combatant commands to combat the threats posed by illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing.

(b) **ELEMENTS.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall include a detailed summary of each of the following for each combatant command:

(1) Activities undertaken as of the date on which the report is submitted to combat the threats posed by illegal, unreported, and un-

regulated fishing in the geographic area of the combatant command, including the steps taken to build the capacity of partners to combat those threats.

(2) Coordination among the United States Armed Forces, partner countries, and public-private partnerships to combat the threats described in paragraph (1).

(3) Efforts undertaken to support unclassified data integration, analysis, and delivery with regional partners to combat the threats described in paragraph (1).

(4) Information sharing and coordination with efforts of the Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing.

(5) Best practices and lessons learned from ongoing and previous efforts relating to the threats described in paragraph (1), including strategies for coordination and successes in public-private partnerships.

(6) Limitations related to affordability, resource constraints, or other gaps or factors that constrain the success or expansion of efforts related to the threats described in paragraph (1).

(7) Any new authorities needed to support efforts to combat the threats described in paragraph (1).

(c) **FORM.**—The report required by subsection (a) shall be submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified annex.

(d) **DEFINITIONS.**—In this section:

(1) **APPROPRIATE COMMITTEES OF CONGRESS.**—The term “appropriate committees of Congress” means—

(A) Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate; and

(B) the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Natural Resources, the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives.

(2) **INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON IUU FISHING.**—The term “Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing” means the working group established by section 3551 of the Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement Act (16 U.S.C. 8031).

**SA 4668.** Mr. CRUZ (for himself, Mrs. GILLIBRAND, Ms. MURKOWSKI, Mr. COONS, Mr. CRAMER, Mr. HAWLEY, Mr. MARSHALL, Mr. LUJÁN, Ms. BALDWIN, Mr. BENNET, and Mr. HICKENLOOPER) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr. REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of subtitle E of title V, add the following:

**SEC. 576. PROHIBITION ON LIMITING OF CERTAIN PARENTAL GUARDIANSHIP RIGHTS OF CADETS AND MIDSHIPMEN.**

(a) **PROHIBITION.**—

(1) **IN GENERAL.**—The Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with the Secretaries of the military departments and the Superintendent of each Federal service academy, as appropriate, shall prescribe in regulations policies that include the option to preserve parental guardianship

rights of cadets and midshipmen are protected consistent with individual and academic responsibilities.

(2) DEVELOPMENT OF POLICY TO PROTECT PARANTAL RIGHTS.—

(A) IN GENERAL.—Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Transportation shall implement a policy that includes the option to preserve the parental rights of Federal service academy students who become pregnant or father a child while attending a Federal service academy.

(B) REPORT.—Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Secretary of Transportation shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the legislative changes needed to support the policy developed pursuant to paragraph (1).

(3) OPTIONS FOR PREGNANT CADETS AND MIDSHIPMEN.—The regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall provide that females who become pregnant while enrolled at a Federal service academy shall have, at a minimum, the following options to be elected by the cadet or midshipman:

(A) At the conclusion of the current semester or when otherwise deemed medically appropriate, the individual may take an unpaid leave of absence from the Federal service academy for up to one year followed by a return to full cadet or midshipman status (if remaining otherwise qualified).

(B) Seek a transfer to a university with a Reserve Officer Training Program for military service under the military department concerned.

(C) Full release from the Federal service academy and any service or financially related obligations, regardless of commitment status.

(D) Enlistment in military active-duty service, with all of the attendant benefits.

(4) TREATMENT OF MALES WHO FATHER A CHILD WHILE ENROLLED AT A FEDERAL SERVICE ACADEMY.—The regulations prescribed under paragraph (1) shall provide for the following policies regarding males who may father a child while enrolled at a Federal service academy:

(A) Academy leadership shall establish policies to allow cadets and midshipmen at least two weeks of leave to attend the birth, which must be used in conjunction with the birth; and

(B) The academy shall provide the father the same options available to a cadet or midshipman who becomes a mother while enrolled by selecting one of the options outlined in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (3).

(b) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this section shall be construed as requiring or providing for the changing of admission requirements at any of the Federal service academies.

(c) FEDERAL SERVICE ACADEMY DEFINED.—In this section, the term “Federal service academy” means the following:

(1) The United States Military Academy, West Point, New York.

(2) The United States Naval Academy, Annapolis, Maryland.

(3) The United States Air Force Academy, Colorado Springs, Colorado.

(4) The United States Coast Guard Academy, New London, Connecticut.

(5) The United States Merchant Marine Academy, Kings Point, New York.

**SA 4669.** Mr. TOOMEY (for himself and Mr. CARDIN) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed to amendment SA 3867 submitted by Mr.

REED and intended to be proposed to the bill H.R. 4350, to authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2022 for military activities of the Department of Defense, for military construction, and for defense activities of the Department of Energy, to prescribe military personnel strengths for such fiscal year, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

At the end of title XII, add the following:

#### Subtitle H—Iran Sanctions

##### SEC. 1291. SHORT TITLE.

This subtitle may be cited as the “Masih Alinejad Harassment and Unlawful Targeting Act of 2021” or the “Masih Alinejad HUNT Act”.

##### SEC. 1292. FINDINGS.

Congress finds that the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran surveils, harasses, terrorizes, tortures, abducts, and murders individuals who peacefully defend human rights and freedoms in Iran, and innocent entities and individuals considered by the Government of Iran to be enemies of that regime, including United States citizens on United States soil, and takes foreign nationals hostage, including in the following instances:

(1) In 2021, Iranian intelligence agents were indicted for plotting to kidnap United States citizen, women’s rights activist, and journalist Masih Alinejad, from her home in New York City, in retaliation for exercising her rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. Iranian agents allegedly spent at least approximately half a million dollars to capture the outspoken critic of the authoritarianism of the Government of Iran, and studied evacuating her by military-style speedboats to Venezuela before rendition to Iran.

(2) Prior to the New York kidnapping plot, Ms. Alinejad’s family in Iran was instructed by authorities to lure Ms. Alinejad to Turkey. In an attempt to intimidate her into silence, the Government of Iran arrested 3 of Ms. Alinejad’s family members in 2019, and sentenced her brother to 8 years in prison for refusing to denounce her.

(3) According to Federal prosecutors, the same Iranian intelligence network that allegedly plotted to kidnap Ms. Alinejad is also targeting critics of the Government of Iran who live in Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates.

(4) In 2021, an Iranian diplomat was convicted in Belgium of attempting to carry out a 2018 bombing of a dissident rally in France.

(5) In 2021, a Danish high court found a Norwegian citizen of Iranian descent guilty of illegal espionage and complicity in a failed plot to kill an Iranian Arab dissident figure in Denmark.

(6) In 2021, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) appealed to the United Nations to protect BBC Persian employees in London who suffer regular harassment and threats of kidnapping by Iranian government agents.

(7) In 2021, 15 militants allegedly working on behalf of the Government of Iran were arrested in Ethiopia for plotting to attack citizens of Israel, the United States, and the United Arab Emirates, according to United States officials.

(8) In 2020, Iranian agents allegedly kidnapped United States resident and Iranian-German journalist Jamshid Sharmahd, while he was traveling to India through Dubai. Iranian authorities announced they had seized Mr. Sharmahd in “a complex operation”, and paraded him blindfolded on state television. Mr. Sharmahd is arbitrarily detained in Iran, allegedly facing the death penalty. In 2009,

Mr. Sharmahd was the target of an alleged Iran-directed assassination plot in Glendora, California.

(9) In 2020, the Government of Turkey released counterterrorism files exposing how Iranian authorities allegedly collaborated with drug gangs to kidnap Habib Chabi, an Iranian-Swedish activist for Iran’s Arab minority. In 2020, the Government of Iran allegedly lured Mr. Chabi to Istanbul through a female agent posing as a potential lover. Mr. Chabi was then allegedly kidnapped from Istanbul, and smuggled into Iran where he faces execution, following a sham trial.

(10) In 2020, a United States-Iranian citizen and an Iranian resident of California pleaded guilty to charges of acting as illegal agents of the Government of Iran by surveilling Jewish student facilities, including the Hillel Center and Rohr Chabad Center at the University of Chicago, in addition to surveilling and collecting identifying information about United States citizens and nationals who are critical of the Iranian regime.

(11) In 2019, 2 Iranian intelligence officers at the Iranian consulate in Turkey allegedly orchestrated the assassination of Iranian dissident journalist Masoud Molavi Vardanjani, who was shot while walking with a friend in Istanbul. Unbeknownst to Mr. Molavi, his “friend” was in fact an undercover Iranian agent and the leader of the killing squad, according to a Turkish police report.

(12) In 2019, around 1,500 people were allegedly killed amid a less than 2 week crackdown by security forces on anti-government protests across Iran, including at least an alleged 23 children and 400 women.

(13) In 2019, Iranian operatives allegedly lured Paris-based Iranian journalist Ruhollah Zam to Iraq, where he was abducted, and hanged in Iran for sedition.

(14) In 2019, a Kurdistan regional court convicted an Iranian female for trying to lure Voice of America reporter Ali Javanmardi to a hotel room in Irbil, as part of a foiled Iranian intelligence plot to kidnap and extradite Mr. Javanmardi, a critic of the Government of Iran.

(15) In 2019, Federal Bureau of Investigation agents visited the rural Connecticut home of Iran-born United States author and poet Roya Hakakian to warn her that she was the target of an assassination plot orchestrated by the Government of Iran.

(16) In 2019, the Government of Denmark accused the Government of Iran of directing the assassination of Iranian Arab activist Ahmad Mola Nissi, in The Hague, and the assassination of another opposition figure, Reza Kolahi Samadi, who was murdered near Amsterdam in 2015.

(17) In 2018, German security forces searched for 10 alleged spies who were working for Iran’s al-Quds Force to collect information on targets related to the local Jewish community, including kindergartens.

(18) In 2017, Germany convicted a Pakistani man for working as an Iranian agent to spy on targets including a former German lawmaker and a French-Israeli economics professor.

(19) In 2012, an Iranian American pleaded guilty to conspiring with members of the Iranian military to bomb a popular Washington, D.C., restaurant with the aim of assassinating the ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United States.

(20) In 1996, agents of the Government of Iran allegedly assassinated 5 Iranian dissident exiles across Turkey, Pakistan, and Baghdad, over a 5-month period that year.

(21) In 1992, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office of the United Kingdom expelled 2 Iranians employed at the Iranian Embassy in London and a third Iranian on a